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ABSTRACT 
 Within the Department of Defense, offset strategies are policies of competition 
that mandate efforts to maintain technological superiority to generate or sustain a 
strategic advantage over near-peer competitor adversaries. The current strategy, the Third 
Offset, was implemented in 2014 and directs the development and leveraging of 
emergent, capabilities-based technologies to defend against the modernized, near-peer 
competitor nations of Russia and China. This thesis used unclassified resources to 
summarize the reactiveness of the previous offset strategies, define military supremacy, 
identify challenges to the Third Offset Strategy, and provide evidence that the current 
strategy is devalued. It also identified a list of conditions which, if met, render the 
strategy obsolete, ultimately determining that the Third Offset is, indeed, obsolete in its 
current form; it is unable to provide a strategic advantage to the United States. Finally, 
the thesis offers recommendations to the Department of Defense to reinforce the Third 
Offset Strategy with a goal of restoring its efficacy. 
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This thesis answers the question: How can the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
determine if the Third Offset Strategy is obsolete? Within the DoD, offset strategies are 
policies of competition that mandate efforts to maintain technological superiority to 
generate or sustain a strategic advantage over near-peer competitor adversaries of the state. 
The DoD only implements a new offset strategy after competitive adversaries attain parity 
with U.S. capabilities, causing the DoD to lose its strategic advantage. While the United 
States is transitioning between offset strategies, the country is potentially vulnerable to 
adversary actions and the DoD holds no strategic advantage.  
As their names suggest, the First Offset Strategy and the Second Offset Strategy 
preceded the current strategy, the Third Offset Strategy. The First Offset was implemented 
to counter the Soviet Union’s sizeable advantages with nuclear weapons superiority in the 
early 1950s.1 In response, the Soviet Union reinvigorated its own nuclear weapons 
program, ultimately surpassing U.S. nuclear capabilities.2 To offset this, and to regain the 
strategic advantage, the DoD implemented the Second Offset in the 1970s, which 
developed superior technology in standoff weapons, precise targeting weaponry, and 
stealth capabilities to overcome and deter Communist nuclear superiority.3 While the 
United States was decisively engaged in its global war on terrorism, Russia and China 
invested heavily in modernizing their military capabilities to the point of parity with U.S. 
capabilities.4 In response, the DoD published the Third Offset Strategy in 2014. This Third 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of State, “Report to the National Security Counsel by the Executive Secretary,” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 1, ed. Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Petersen 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), https://history.state.gov/historical 
documents/frus1952-54v02p1/d101. 
2 William J. Perry, “Technology and National Security: Risks and Responsibilities,” paper presented at 
Conference on Risk and Responsibility in Contemporary Engineering and Science, French and U.S. 
Perspectives, Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, 2003, https://stanford.edu/dept/france-
stanford/Conferences/Risk/Perry.pdf. 
3 Joseph Felter, “It’s Not Just the Technology: Beyond Offset Strategies,” Strategika, no. 39 (March 
2017), https://www.hoover.org/research/its-not-just-technology-beyond-offset-strategies. 
4 Robert Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies” (speech, 
January 28, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-
offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies/. 
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Offset directed the development and leveraging of emergent, capabilities-based 
technologies to defend against the modernized, near-peer competitor nations of Russia and 
China.5 
The objective of this thesis is to proactively assess the conditions that, if met, will 
degrade the deterrent value of Third Offset. In the high-stakes game of national security 
and homeland defense, there is scarce time for an operational pause to reevaluate and 
reorient strategies. It is critical to proactively plan for when the Third Offset will lose 
relevancy and no longer afford the United States a decisive advantage over its competitors. 
Due to their reactive design, stakeholders have historically realized offset strategies are 
obsolete only after the United States has lost its strategic advantage, which places the 
country at an unnecessary risk from near-peer competitors. By understanding what could 
render the Third Offset obsolete, what already has degraded it, and how to control the flow 
of disruptive innovations into the homeland defense realm, the DoD is better postured to 
maintain the strategic advantage by either weighting the Third Offset to prolong the 
strategy or by determining when to replace it in advance of near-peer parity and before 
sacrificing its international strategic advantage. 
This thesis holds that, in its current form, the Third Offset Strategy is obsolete and 
incapable of providing a meaningful strategic advantage for the United States with 
reinforcement. The strategy’s overreliance on technology-based solutions increases the 
country’s vulnerability to espionage (particularly cyber espionage), enhances its 
susceptibility to intellectual property theft, and places false faith in technologies that have 
yet to be discovered. Beyond these technological concerns, the strategy is constrained by 
resource funding and authorization limitations. These include the persistent fiscal 
constraints of the current operating environment, the competing homeland defense 
priorities of the DoD, the unclear objectives guiding the Third Offset, and the role that 
national willingness to accept policies plays in the development and employment of the 
Third Offset. Countering parity with near-peer competitors is an ongoing, ever-adaptive 
                                                 
5 Chuck Hagel, “The Defense Innovation Initiative” (official memorandum, Department of Defense, 
2017), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf. 
xiii 
process. State adversaries have not been stagnant; they have been continually adapting and 
fluctuating to attain their own strategic advantages. This thesis presents evidence of 
Chinese and Russian activities to counter the U.S. advantages afforded by the Third Offset, 
as well as the inadvertently adverse effect the strategy has had on national alliances. 
The forecasted options for the DoD are to reinforce the Third Offset, to make it 
more enduring, or to replace it altogether before competitors achieve parity and challenge 
the United States’ strategic advantage. To accomplish these objectives, this thesis 
recommends specific actions the DoD should execute. To counter threats of intellectual 
property theft and cyberespionage, the DoD should weaponize the creative destruction 
process.6 To counter the Third Offset's reliance on nonexistent technologies, the DoD 
should not neglect its conventional warfare technologies and should also focus its resources 
and efforts on the development of technologies toward established strategic objectives. To 
counter the cyber threat, the DoD should leverage the deep-learning capacity of Third 
Offset technologies toward attribution of cyber attacks while hardening the existing 
network and building robust deterrence through first-strike capabilities. To counter the 
persistent fiscal constraints, the DoD should exercise patience and recognize that 
technology failure is a critical process of innovation. To establish clear strategic objectives 
for the Third Offset, the strategy should be specified in the National Defense Strategy as a 
path to secure the national interests of the National Security Strategy. To ensure 
conformance with the nation’s willingness to employ the strategy, the DoD should ensure 
the Third Offset remains within the standards and interpretations of just war.7 To narrow 
the technology gap with allies, the DoD should increase the sharing of technological 
advances with trusted allies to preserve (and improve) existing international relations, 
enhance the allied nations’ roles in securing U.S. national interests as well as their own, 
and avoid building resentment of U.S. superiority from friend and foe alike.     
                                                 
6 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy (London: Routledge, 1943), 83, 
eet.pixel-online.org/files/etranslation/original/Schumpeter,%20Capitalism,%20Socialism%20 
and%20Democracy.pdf. 
7 Encyclopedia of Global Religion, s.v. “Just War,” ed. Mark Juergensmeyer and Wade Roof 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412997898.n375. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS QUESTION 
This thesis answers the question: How can the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
determine if the Third Offset Strategy is obsolete? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Within the DoD, offset strategies are policies of competition that mandate efforts 
to maintain technological superiority to generate or sustain a strategic advantage over near-
peer competitor adversaries of the state. The DoD develops offset strategies to overcome 
the parity of such competitors and only implements a new offset strategy after competitive 
adversaries attain parity with U.S. capabilities, causing the DoD to lose its strategic 
advantage. While the United States is transitioning between offset strategies, the country 
is potentially vulnerable to adversary actions and the DoD holds no strategic advantage. 
To date, there have been three offset strategies implemented by the DoD to obtain 
strategic advantages over near-peer competitors. The First Offset Strategy (active in the 
1950s through the 1970s) sought to counter the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons 
superiority.1 The Soviet Union responded by reinvigorating its own nuclear weapons 
program, ultimately achieving parity with U.S. capabilities.2 Seeking a means to offset this 
parity, and holding no strategic advantage over its most dangerous threat-nation, the DoD 
began working toward the Second Offset Strategy.  
The Second Offset Strategy (mid-1970s through 2014) deployed superior 
technology in standoff weapons, precise targeting weaponry, and stealth capabilities to 
1 U.S. Department of State, “Report to the National Security Counsel by the Executive Secretary,” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 1, ed. Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Petersen 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), https://history.state.gov/historical 
documents/frus1952-54v02p1/d101. 
2 William J. Perry, “Technology and National Security: Risks and Responsibilities” (paper presented 
at Conference on Risk and Responsibility in Contemporary Engineering and Science, French and U.S. 
Perspectives, Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, 2003), https://stanford.edu/dept/france-
stanford/Conferences/Risk/Perry.pdf. 
2 
overcome and deter Communist nuclear superiority.3 In the early twenty-first century, 
while the United States was decisively engaged in the global war on terrorism, near-peer 
competitors (i.e., Russia and China) modernized their military capabilities to be on par with 
U.S. capabilities.4 Again seeking to offset this parity and once again hold strategic 
advantage over its largest competitors, the DoD sought a new strategy.  
The Third Offset Strategy (the current strategy, referred to in this thesis simply as 
the Third Offset) was introduced in 2014 and seeks to develop and leverage emergent, 
capabilities-based technologies to defend against the modernized, near-peer competitor 
nations of Russia and China.5 With the Third Offset approaching its fifth anniversary, this 
is an optimal time to think about the strategy’s longevity. The Third Offset’s heavy reliance 
on network-enabled, technology-based solutions may make the strategy susceptible to 
replication and proliferation, particularly if competing nations execute a campaign of 
intellectual property theft and hacking. Persistent fiscal constraints, competing homeland 
defense priorities, and national reticence to employ such a strategy to its fullest capability 
also threaten to prevent or degrade the strategic advantage afforded by the Third Offset. As 
former Secretary of Defense James Mattis has frequently stated, “The enemy gets a vote.”6 
Credible counteractions by a thinking, technologically advanced, and equally determined 
adversary can quickly deflate the value of the Third Offset.  
In the high-stakes game of national security and homeland defense, there is scarce 
time for an operational pause to reevaluate and reorient strategy. It is critical to proactively 
plan for when the Third Offset will lose relevancy and no longer afford the United States 
a decisive advantage over its competitors. Due to their reactive design, stakeholders have 
historically realized offset strategies are obsolete only after the United States has lost its 
                                                 
3 Joseph Felter, “It’s Not Just the Technology: Beyond Offset Strategies,” Strategika, no. 39 (March 
2017), https://www.hoover.org/research/its-not-just-technology-beyond-offset-strategies. 
4 Robert Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies” (speech, 
January 28, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-
offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies/. 
5 Chuck Hagel, “The Defense Innovation Initiative” (official memorandum, Department of Defense, 
2017), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf. 
6 Jon B. Alterman, “The Enemy Gets a Vote,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 16, 
2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/enemy-gets-vote. 
3 
strategic advantage, which places the country at an unnecessary risk from near-peer 
competitors. By understanding what could render the Third Offset obsolete, what already 
has degraded it, and how to control the flow of disruptive innovations into the homeland 
defense realm, the DoD is better postured to maintain its strategic advantage by either 
weighting the Third Offset to prolong the strategy or determining when to replace it in 
advance of near-peer parity and before sacrificing the strategic advantage. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The objective of this study is to determine the validity and relevancy of the DoD’s 
current strategy, the Third Offset. The 2014 “Defense Innovation Initiative” memorandum 
(the Third Offset) called for a “Department-wide initiative to pursue innovative ways to 
sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st Century.”7 This strategy includes 
“long-range research and development planning programs to identify, develop and field 
breakthroughs in technologies and warfare systems which maintain and promote U.S. 
military power; Department-wide support for these initiatives; and leveraging the industrial 
base towards homeland defense priorities.”8  
While this research analyzes previous offset strategies, the purpose is not to provide 
case studies of the First and Second Offsets; the earlier strategies are described only to 
explain how the United States lost its strategic advantage. The focus of this research is 
identifying the conditions and factors that should trigger the replacement of the Third 
Offset before it becomes obsolete, thereby allowing the United States to maintain its 
strategic advantage (as opposed to the otherwise inevitable need to regain it). This research 
uses unclassified, unlimited-distribution literature. Primary sources are DoD and other 
governmental publications, journal articles, publicly released reports, theses, and 
associated online content (blog posts, websites, etc.).  
In Chapter II, the thesis defines superiority and supremacy within the United States, 
as well as for U.S. allies and adversaries. Chapter III describes what offset strategies are 
                                                 
7 Hagel, “The Defense Innovation Initiative.” 
8 Hagel. 
4 
and why they are important to homeland defense. This includes a summary of the First and 
Second Offset Strategies, specifying not only what they did but also why they were 
replaced, to provide context for the central point of this thesis: that new offset strategies 
were implemented to allow the United States to regain the strategic advantage it lost. 
Chapter IV discusses how the United States secures its superiority and what the nation 
gains from it to build the framework for the objectives of the offset strategies. Next, in 
Chapter V, the research analyzes factors that will cause the Third Offset Strategy to fail. 
This analysis makes it possible to identify the conditions that would render the strategy 
obsolete and to determine if such conditions already exist.  
Finally, in Chapter VI, the research offers actions the DoD could execute in 
response to such conditions. The forecasted options for the DoD are to reinforce the Third 
Offset, to make it more enduring, or to replace it altogether before competitors achieve 
parity and challenge the United States’ strategic advantage. The final product of this 
research is recommendations the DoD can use to reinforce the Third Offset or identify 




This thesis focuses acutely on military superiority, as it relates to the Third Offset 
Strategy. It is acknowledged that the military is but one of the United States’ instruments 
of national power and that national security writ large depends on the interoperability of 
diplomatic, information, military, and economic functions. The offset strategies enhance 
or ensure the superiority of the military as a component of this national power. A central 
purpose for this thesis is to highlight the reactive nature of the offset strategies in an effort 
to proactively sustain strategic advantage rather than to reactively recover the advantage. 
In evaluating near-peer competitors, this thesis focuses on Russia and China as the states 
nearest to parity with the United States. This does not imply that Iran, North Korea, and 
violent extremist organizations do not present credible threats to the homeland. Nor does 
it mean that military actions in Syria and Africa or against transnational criminal 
organizations are not credible homeland defense priorities. As states, however, Russia and 
China represent the most plausible threats to U.S. national security. The Third Offset 
Strategy, like its predecessors, is heavily reliant on advanced technologies; this thesis 
explores the effects and consequences of establishing and sustaining technological 
superiority, including related implications to adversaries and allies alike.  
A. TRENDS OF REACTIVITY 
In his 2014 reexamination of Project Solarium—the original name for what would 
retroactively be called the First Offset Strategy—Michael Gallagher describes the U.S. 
national security environment of the 1950s as one where the threats of Communism were 
spreading at an alarming and uncontrollable rate, and one where the United States was at 
the disadvantage.9 The Soviet Union posed a substantial risk to U.S. national security, and 
the United States found itself without a strategic advantage over its competition. The 
9 Michael J. Gallagher, “Intelligence and National Security Strategy: Reexamining Project Solarium,” 
Intelligence and National Security 30, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 476–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
02684527.2014.885203. 
6 
United States responded with the First Offset Strategy as a means to balance potential 
conflict into its favor, but this was only after the state had been disadvantaged. 
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who was instrumental in the 
development and implementation of the Second Offset Strategy while serving as the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in the 1970s, echoed the reactive 
nature of U.S. response to Soviet nuclear parity. He said that prior to the implementation 
of the Second Offset Strategy, the Soviet Union held a threefold advantage in conventional 
weapons over the United States.10 The United States had lost the upper hand over its most 
threatening adversary and was forced to react (in the form of the Second Offset Strategy) 
to regain the strategic advantage. 
In his 2015 speech titled “The Third Offset Strategy and its Implications for 
Partners and Allies,” then Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work described the 
passivity that led to the United States once again losing its strategic advantage. “While the 
United States and our closest allies fought two lengthy wars over the past 13 years,” Work 
said, “the rest of the world and our potential adversaries were seeing how we operated. 
They looked at our advantages. They studied them. They analyzed them. They looked for 
weaknesses. And then they set about devising ways to counter our technological over-
match.”11 By 2014, the United States had again lost the strategic advantage and was forced 
to react with the Third Offset Strategy. 
B. MILITARY SUPERIORITY 
In 2003 Barry R. Posen, a professor of political science at MIT, stated that the 
United States seized command of the “common” international domains (air, sea, and space) 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. Posen says that the wide array of nuclear attack 
submarines and aircraft carriers provides the United States with unsurpassed maritime 
capabilities.12 He also states that the diverse capabilities of traditional and next-generation 
10 Perry, “Technology and National Security.” 
11 Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy.” 
12 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” 
International Security 28, no. 1 (July 2003): 11–12, https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803322427965. 
7 
U.S. military aircraft, coupled with vast stockpiles of precision-guided munitions and 
limited credible ground-based threats to U.S. aircraft, affords unparalleled superiority of 
the skies.13 Regarding space, Posen acknowledges that the United States has not 
committed fully to conducting combat operations in or from space, but that the country 
recognizes the strategic interests within this domain.14 Nevertheless, Posen states that 
research and development into anti-satellite technology as well as redundant surveillance 
capabilities makes the United States less vulnerable and satellite-dependent in the space 
domain.15  
Michael O’Hanlon and David Petraeus, in the fall of 2016, provided an overall 
assessment of U.S. military supremacy. Their assessment aligns with Posen’s claim of the 
United States’ “command of the commons,” claiming that the U.S. forces “play in a totally 
different league from the militaries of other countries.”16 They cite the health of the DoD’s 
procurement budget, the rejuvenated focus on innovation, and the high quality of today’s 
armed forces personnel as key contributing factors to this supremacy. O’Hanlon and 
Petraeus also say that the U.S. high-tech innovation sectors, economic stability, growing 
population, and trade policies play a non-military role in ensuring the supremacy of the 
U.S. military.17 More importantly, they assess that the U.S. system of alliances and global 
partnerships plays the largest role in assuring the dominance of the U.S. military. Despite 
this military superiority, O’Hanlon and Petraeus do see several constraints to its 
deployment. Difficulties in targeting adversaries hidden deep within urban centers, or with 
enemies masking their identities and intentions behind innocuous disguises, could limit the 
United States from leveraging its full military power.18  
                                                 
13 Posen, 15–16. 
14 Posen, 12–13. 
15 Posen, 14. 
16 Michael O’Hanlon and David Petraeus, “America’s Awesome Military: And How to Make it Even 
Better,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 5 (September/October 2016): 10, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2016-07-22/america-s-awesome-military. 
17 O’Hanlon and Petraeus, 11. 
18 O’Hanlon and Petraeus, 12 
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As U.S. Army Strategist Matt Cavanaugh points outs, overmatch in warfare 
technology alone does not automatically guarantee decisive success on the battlefield. To 
support this claim, he offers the example of the recent U.S. engagements in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where the U.S. forces held considerable technological advantages over 
adversaries yet remained engaged in prolonged and bloody conflicts.19 Cavanaugh’s 
argument is that capabilities overmatch did not produce swift and decisive victory during 
operations in the Middle East, so we should not expect it to do so against stronger, near-
peer competitors.20  
Charles T. Cleveland et al., in a RAND report, claim that the U.S. military’s 
dominance in the realm of conventional warfare capabilities has subsequently left it 
impotent against unconventional, technology-based attacks.21 They offer that the U.S. 
military’s acumen in destroying the enemy and occupying its terrain is entirely ineffective 
against adversaries using nonconventional means (such as hacking) to establish influence 
or gain legitimacy. Cleveland et al. claim that U.S. adversaries successfully attack the 
United States through nonconventional means because the adversaries study the United 
States’ successes in conventional warfare and adapt to avoid the country’s strengths and 
exploit its weaknesses. This misplaced reliance on conventional warfare capabilities, and 
the U.S. military’s failure to recognize and adapt to the nonconventional forms of warfare 
used by adversaries, they say, significantly degrades the military’s readiness and ability to 
respond effectively to any threats (conventional or otherwise).22  
A large part of the United States’ ability to project its military power globally is its 
alliances. A frequent contributor on this topic, especially regarding the European allies, is 
Daniel Fiott of the Institute for European Studies. Fiott acknowledges the significant 
challenges to the U.S. power projection but states that Third Offset technologies may 
                                                 
19 Matt L. Cavanaugh, “False Faith: The Third Offset Isn’t a Strategy and Won’t Win Our Next War,” 
Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy, February 10, 2017, https://mwi.usma.edu/false-
faith-third-offset-isnt-strategy-wont-win-next-war/. 
20 Cavanaugh. 
21 Charles T. Cleveland et al., An American Way of Political Warfare: A Proposal, PE-304 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE304.html.  
22 Cleveland et al. 
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actually impede the United States’ ability to project power globally. Exploitation of Third 
Offset innovations, Fiott says, may further widen the already resident technology gap 
between the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.23 
He also offers that our allies, a significant source of U.S. power projection, might view a 
rebalancing of the strategy toward the Asia–Pacific as detracting the DoD’s focus from the 
European theater.24 Fiott further explains that, when faced with the growing technology 
gaps and the lowered prioritization of Eastern Europe for U.S. defense efforts, NATO is 
less likely to invest in Third Offset technologies or even in the strategy writ large.25 A 
sympathetic issue Fiott (and Renaud Bellais) later explain is that the U.S. investment in 
Third Offset technology may not necessarily be open to European markets.26 They argue 
that, without comparable European Union investments to Third Offset–like disruptive 
innovations, their economic markets could destabilize.27 Such an event would have lasting 
adverse effects on the U.S. power projection capabilities through our allies.  
The U.S. military owes much of its superiority to what Carl von Clausewitz calls 
military genius. In Masters of War, Michael I. Handel explains that Clausewitz believed 
numerically inferior militaries could prevail in war if they effectively synchronized their 
intelligence, deception, offense, defense, weaponry, and terrain exploitation efforts toward 
a unified effort.28 In terms of the Third Offset Strategy, this means that U.S. military 
supremacy cannot be solely attributed to the military’s sheer size and strength. It is the 
application of military genius, in part through the offset strategies, that enables the United 
States to maintain its military superiority. 
                                                 
23 Daniel Fiott, “Europe and the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy,” RUSI 161, no. 1 (March 2016): 
29, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1152118. 
24 Fiott, 29–30. 
25 Daniel Fiott, “A Revolution Too Far? U.S. Defence Innovation, Europe and NATO’s Military-
Technological Gap,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 3 (May, 2016): 423–429, https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/0140239.2016.1176565. 
26 Renaud Bellais and Daniel Fiott, “The European Defense Market: Disruptive Innovation and 
Market Destabilization,” Economics of Peace and Security 12, no. 1 (April 2017): 40–41, https://www-
epsjournal-org-uk.libproxy.nps.edu/index.php/EPSJ. 
27 Bellais and Fiott, 42–43. 
28 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Routledge, 2005), 118–
125, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203017746. 
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Theories on deterrence play no small part in the supremacy of the U.S. military. 
Hans Morgenthau understood that the propensity for warfare between competing nations 
declines if there is a balance of power between them.29 Stability increases when there is 
an equilibrium between competing states’ capabilities and capacities. The theory of mutual 
assured destruction supports Morgenthau’s beliefs. Robert Jervis describes mutual assured 
destruction as a situation wherein competing entities are deterred from deploying their most 
destructive and devastating capabilities against each other because both sides understand 
that the reciprocal response will be equally dreadful.30 In short, neither side attacks the 
other first because they anticipate an equal-in-kind response. 
Robert Jervis refutes the theory of mutual assured destruction with what he 
describes as the security dilemma.31 He says that all states want to feel secure and will 
execute measures independently to assure their own security. This creates a vicious cycle 
of insecurity: as one state takes steps to make itself more secure, other states feel 
increasingly insecure and threatened; states respond to the perceived threats from each 
other, tensions increase and overall security and stability decrease. 
C. NEAR-PEER PARITY 
Thomas Szayna et al. believe that intent is what distinguishes the difference 
between a U.S. peer and a peer competitor state of the United States.32 Their RAND report 
states that peer states of the United States merely hold comparable capabilities, but the peer 
competitors have both the comparable capabilities and the stated (or demonstrated) 
intentions to use those capabilities in competition with (or in opposition to) the United 
States. Szayna et al. identify four criteria for classification as a near-peer competitor with 
the United States: power, motivation, global scale, and outcome in doubt. According their 
                                                 
29 As quoted in Michael Sheehan, Balance of Power: History & Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), 
8–9, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203344613. 
30 Robert Jervis, “Mutual Assured Destruction,” Foreign Policy, no. 133 (Nov/Dec 2002): 40, 
https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/3183553?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
31 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 
167–214, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958. 
32 Thomas S. Szayna et al., The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis, MR-
1346-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1346.html. 
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analysis, power does not simply come from the existence of a dominant military presence. 
Economic, diplomatic technological adeptness; education; industrialization; and a strong 
legal system also contribute to national power. Szayna et al. claim that true peer 
competitors are motivated by the intention to enhance their own national power while 
simultaneously devaluing the influence of other states’ power in the region. Global scale, 
they say, is not a peer competitor’s ability to act anywhere worldwide. Instead, Szayna et 
al. say that global scale is the peer competitor’s ability to act globally in the regions critical 
to the United States. The final near-peer competitor criterion Szayna et al. identify is the 
ability to credibly challenge the United States’ relative combat power in such a way that, 
if engaged in a conflict, a decisively victorious outcome for the United States would be in 
doubt.33  
In his 1987 book, Paul Kennedy claims that great powers can only be measured 
relative to the ascendance and decline of competing powers.34 The relative strengths and 
weaknesses of national superpowers are never constant because states grow (or decline) 
and experience technological or industrial breakthroughs at uneven rates.35 In short, this 
means that rotations in state statuses between superior, near-peer, and in decline are 
temporary and occur at uneven rates. Kennedy theorizes that the great powers in history 
have not ascended solely because of the strength and prowess of their militaries but because 
of the interrelated correlations of the states’ military power, their use of economic 
production during wartime, and their long-term economic stability relative to their 
competitors.36 In terms of near-peer parity, this means that efforts to counter and overcome 
the parity of competing nations require more than just military supremacy. 
A central point to any discussion of near-peer states’ parity with the United States 
is an evaluation of the national interests of those states. Understanding the competing 
states’ strategic objectives provides insight into the principles guiding their responses to 
                                                 
33 Szayna et al. 
34 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000, Kindle edition (New York: Random House, 1987), loc. 156. 
35 Kennedy, loc. 169. 
36 Kennedy, loc. 156–157. 
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U.S. supremacy. According to the Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 
the Chinese “core national interests” support the protection and advancement of China. 
Chinese officials say these are:  
• The preservation of Chinese sovereignty 
• Security of the state of China 
• The integrity and reunification of Chinese territories 
• The safeguarding of China’s political and social systems 
• An enduring economy37  
The Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests assesses that the Russian 
“principal national interests” align toward achieving weapons superiority and state 
security, and maintaining (or regaining) influence over former Soviet regions. These 
“interests” are: 
• Stopping the use of nuclear or mass-destruction weapons against former 
Soviet territories (including Russia itself) 
• Achieving deterrence through nuclear superiority 
• Preventing terrorism in Russia 
• Maintaining influence over former Soviet states while degrading outside 
influences in those regions 
• Growing the economy with the exportation of energy 
• Preserving the Russian political system(s) 
                                                 
37 Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: People’s Republic 
of China, 2011), http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm. 
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• Advancing the Russian elites’ major economic and political-business 
alliances38 
On the subject of international responses to, and parity with, the United States, 
Vasily Kashin is a frequent commenter from the Russian perspective. In 2017, he and 
Michael Raska published a policy report titled “Countering the U.S. Third Offset Strategy: 
Russian Perspectives, Responses and Challenges.” In this report, they state that the 
Russians are also exploring advanced unmanned platforms as well as sourcing innovation 
institutions to help discover next-generation technologies.39 The Russian Advanced 
Research Foundation (ARF) holds a similar mission purpose as the U.S. Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA): to research and develop high-risk, high-payoff 
technologies including artificial intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cognitive 
technologies, among other next-generation capabilities.40 Kashin and Raska postulate that 
the Russians are in the advanced stages of some technological areas, such as direct-energy 
weapons, rail guns, hypersonic vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles. 
In his 2017 research brief, Fan Gaoyue, a retired Chinese senior military officer, 
said that China is unlikely to react energetically to the United States because 1) China likely 
sees the Third Offset Strategy as an attempt to instigate a technological arms race with 
China (and Russia) in which the United States has a distinct advantage; 2) China sees the 
strategy as a ruse by the United States to mask its own waning power; or 3) China 
recognizes that the Third Offset Strategy seeks to strengthen U.S. national security through 
technological superiority.41 Fan says that China is unlikely to deviate from its goal to 
                                                 
38 Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests, Russia and U.S. National Interests (Cambridge, 
MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2011), 
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rejuvenate its national power status, but will probably continue to invest in Third Offset–
like technologies to reduce the gap between U.S. and Chinese military capabilities.42  
D. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 
Clayton Christensen introduces the idea of disruptive technologies.43 Christensen 
differentiates these from sustaining technologies, which merely improve upon existing 
innovations and products. Contrarily, he defines disruptive technologies as entirely new 
innovations which fulfill needs never before addressed. Generally, in business, disruptive 
technologies create new markets and new customers and usually perform poorly until 
broader they are adopted more broadly.44 The discussion of disruptive technologies is 
relevant to this thesis because, as William Thomas of the American Institute of Physics 
pointed out in his analysis of a June 2017 Government Accountability Office report, the 
DoD seeks to make Third Offset Strategy technologies disruptive.45 Disruptive 
technologies are also highly relevant to the discussions of the Third Offset because most 
innovations of this nature do not begin life with a stated intention for homeland defense 
applications. Early adoption of disruptive technologies may prove to differentiate between 
gaining a strategic advantage and seeking to counter an adversary’s advanced technology. 
While his theory of creative destruction was originally designed for economic and 
industrial applications, Joseph Schumpeter’s concept remains equally relevant to the 
innovation specified in the Third Offset. The theory says that markets fail because, 
internally, they are in a perpetual state of change; they constantly destroy old industries 
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and innovate new industries in order to suit the new demands of consumers.46 This eternal 
destruction and building in the industry provides reduced market stability and results in 
limited innovation because the needs being filled constantly change.47 Applying 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction theory to innovative research and development (as in the 
Third Offset Strategy), Jeho Lee et al. call this a losing strategy.48 They say the technology 
competitions between states, or even among industries within a single state, results in fewer 
overall survivors of the competition over time.49 The costs of long-term innovation 
competition outweigh the short-term innovative technology gains, Lee et al. say.50 
Evidence of Christensen’s and Schumpeter’s theories already exists in U.S. 
relations with China, according to Norton Schwartz. He says the two nations are locked in 
a contest for global economic, military, and political superiority driven by the mastery of 
technology.51 Schwartz argues that talent, not capital, is the most valuable asset in this 
competition. He says that the victor of this competition is the state that can attract and retain 
the best and brightest minds in the field, not the state that can invest the most in 
technological innovations. Schwartz says that this talent pool will naturally gravitate 
toward the freest societal bases. In this sense, he argues that U.S. trade practices, 
immigration laws, and national security policies may be the path for U.S. technological 
superiority.52 
In 2017, Richard Bitzinger penned a research brief on the effects of the Third Offset 
Strategy between near-peer competitors and its suggestions for the global arms industry. 
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The article centers mostly on the growing Chinese anti-access area denial (A2AD) 
capabilities, and how the United States is (or should be) responding.53 In doing so, 
Bitzinger offers two areas of concern relative to disruptive innovations. He believes the 
disruptive innovations of Third Offset technologies are too expensive for many countries 
(U.S. allies included) to produce and employ in a full-scale capacity in their militaries. The 
other matter, which he identifies is perhaps of greatest concern to the United States, is that 
ally nations do not factor U.S. near-peer competition (in this case, China) into their defense 
decision-making processes. In short, Bitzinger says that the United States may be forced to 
pursue disruptive Third Offset technology without great assistance from allies or the 
international community.54 
                                                 
53 A2AD refers to China’s defenses preventing the United States and regional allies from entering and 
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III. BACKGROUND OF THE OFFSET STRATEGIES: 
A TREND OF REACTIVENESS 
Offset strategies are the mechanism by which the DoD counters its adversaries’ 
advantages. The strategies focus on leveraging superior technologic advances toward 
homeland defense priorities. The following is a summary of the three DoD offset strategies 
employed to date. 
While the focus of this thesis is the Third Offset Strategy, and the determination of 
the conditions that will render it obsolete, the analysis of the First and Second Offset 
provides insight to the reactive nature of the strategies as a whole. Each of the three 
strategies came into existence to regain a strategic advantage over competitors. The DoD 
retired the first and second strategies only after they proved obsolete. This speaks 
specifically to the crux of this thesis: that is, determining in advance of parity what will 
render the Third Offset Strategy obsolete. 
A. FIRST OFFSET STRATEGY 
During the Cold War era, the First Offset Strategy was the DoD’s response to the 
Soviet Union’s sizeable geographic advantage in Western Europe.55 Central to the First 
Offset was the deterrent value of nuclear weapons superiority.56 The (retroactively named) 
First Offset Strategy was formally codified on October 30, 1953, as the National Security 
Council’s Basic National Security Policy.57  
In the pursuit and defense of such national interests as a strong and growing 
economy and the containment of Communism, the First Offset specified the requirement 
for “a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive 
retaliatory damage by offensive striking power.”58 The strategy further directed the DoD 
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to “[c]onduct and foster scientific research and development so as to insure superiority in 
quantity and quality of weapons systems, with attendant continuing review of the level and 
composition of forces and of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for 
successful prosecution of general war.”59 In no uncertain terms, the strategy called for the 
stockpiling of atomic weapons and the effective means of their delivery as a major 
contribution to the national security of the United States and its allies.60 
Between 1945 and 1965 the United States’ nuclear weapons arsenal rose from less 
than 10,000 to well over 30,000, by far outnumbering the Soviet capabilities at the time.61 
An intrinsic, but supplemental, development spurring from this buildup of nuclear weapons 
was the fielding of advanced delivery platforms for the weapons themselves. As the nuclear 
weapons stockpile grew and developed, so too did the DoD’s array of strategic bombers to 
deliver these weapons. Since 1945, the United States has purchased over 5,000 additional 
aircraft whose primary mission is nuclear weapons delivery.62 While this statistic may 
seem mundane, it should be noted that such an increase in military equipment triggers a 
significant spike in additional manpower and resources to support the increased 
capabilities. 
The First Offset Strategy proved to be an effective containment and deterrence 
strategy for the United States, but it also sparked the nuclear arms race with the Kremlin.63 
In response to the United States’ increased nuclear weapons capabilities and capacities, the 
Soviet Union revamped its own military modernization.64 Ultimately, the Soviet industrial 
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machine out-produced the United States in conventional and nuclear weapons 
capabilities.65 Beginning in 1949, the Soviet Union manufactured some 55,000 nuclear 
warheads in response to the United States’ nuclear activity.66  
With the Soviet Union’s achievement of nuclear parity (and, in fact, supremacy), 
the First Offset became irrelevant. The strategy reached its maximum effective range and 
had no flexibility to provide the United States with a strategic advantage over its largest 
and most feared adversary. The deterrence value of nuclear superiority provided by the 
First Offset was irrelevant if the United States could not compete with the Soviets on the 
one-dimensional battlefield of nuclear weapons stockpiles. Without a strategic advantage, 
and now vulnerable to a potential attack from the Soviets, the DoD was forced to search 
for another mechanism to regain the upper hand.67 
B. SECOND OFFSET STRATEGY 
The Second Offset Strategy shifted the United States focus toward more accurate 
weaponry.68 Triggered by the Soviet Union’s growing nuclear weapons capabilities, 
Defense Secretary Harold Brown and his staff sought increased resource investment in 
technologies such as stealth technology; long-range, precision-guided munitions; and 
intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance systems.69 The DoD also sought the capability to 
field fewer, but more capable, military forces with the effect of neutralizing the Soviet 
conventional military advantage—essentially, quality over quantity.70 To accomplish this, 
the United States developed precision-guided munitions capable of active trajectory mid-
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flight, aircraft radar defeat mechanisms like stealth technology, and satellite networking 
that enabled global positioning system (GPS) technologies.71 
Secretary Brown and Director for Defense Research and Engineering William 
Perry saw the potential for emergent technology to both improve existing weaponry and to 
better enable capabilities with less capacity. Further seeking to use new technologies for 
homeland defense priorities, Director Perry (ordered by Secretary Brown and under the 
precepts of the Second Offset) directed the development of Assault Breaker: a 
revolutionary concept of battle combining multi-modal, multi-domain, current and future 
capabilities to break the Soviet strongholds through precision targeting.72 Assault Breaker 
used technological advances as a force multiplier for the United States by linking 
conventional U.S. surface- and air-based missile systems with Second Offset precision 
targeting.73 This capability enabled the systematic dismantling of layered Soviet defenses 
at stand-off distances. 
Secretary Brown’s final guidance toward the development and implementation of 
the Second Offset came in the rebirth of cruise missile technology.74 Recognizing the 
strategic applications of this revitalized technology, particularly when coupled with the 
budding GPS technology, Secretary Brown capitalized on the opportunity and embraced 
cruise missile technology as another element of his (and Director Perry’s) Second Offset 
Strategy.75 The Second Offset remained relevant to the United States military as late as the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, when Tomahawk guided missiles were used to neutralize targets of 
military importance in advance of follow-on forces’ movement into the battle area. 
While the United States was decisively engaged in the Global War on Terrorism, 
America’s near-peer competitors invested heavily in the replication and proliferation of 
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Second Offset technology.76 Through reverse engineering, broad international arms 
dealing, and covert espionage practices, the Chinese developed the functions J-20 fifth-
generation aircraft.77 Russian prototypes of stealth aircraft technologies first flew in 2010, 
and the resulting Perspective Front-Line Aviation Complex (PAK FA) aircraft could 
potentially challenge the air superiority provided by Second Offset technology.78 The 
revolution of precision-guided munitions was quickly proliferated throughout the militaries 
of not just the United States, Russia, and China but also every modernized nation.79 
Nearing the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
DoD came to realize the threats posed by the new era of great power competition with the 
resurgent Russian, and rising Chinese, national militaries.80 Once widespread parity 
among Second Offset technologies was achieved, the DoD only then recognized the 
necessity of developing a subsequent strategy to offset the balance of national powers. 
C. THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY 
The Third Offset Strategy was formally announced in November 2014 as “The 
Defense Innovation Initiative” memorandum from then Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel.81 
The memorandum called for a “[d]epartment-wide initiative to pursue innovative ways to 
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sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st Century.”82 In the memorandum, 
Secretary Hagel outlines that the Third Offset shall include revised talent management to 
synthesize leadership development with emerging opportunities, long-range research and 
development of technologies to sustain and advance U.S. military power, a refocusing of 
war-gaming/red team activities to better assess flexibility to the current and future 
environments, the development of innovative approaches using capabilities to counter 
emerging threats, a department-wide approach leveraging the full spectrum of defense 
capabilities, and departmental self-assessment to improve efficiency and effectiveness.83 
Put more succinctly by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, the Third Offset Strategy 
seeks to use technology to augment (not replace) the human component of U.S. military 
warfare.84 
The Third Offset focuses on autonomous learning systems, human-machine 
collaborative decision-making, assisted human operations, advanced manned-unmanned 
systems operations, and network-enabled autonomous weapons and high-speed 
projectiles.85 This strategy also includes the potential for artificial intelligence and self-
automation.86 
While the United States is still in the relatively nascent stages of the Third Offset 
Strategy, and much of the developing technology and capabilities reside within the 
classified enclave, there are a few available examples of advanced warfare technology 
stemming from this directive. Understanding that civilian technology is rapidly (and 
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perpetually) evolving, DARPA has sought to exploit the commercial industry.87 One 
example is DARPA’s work with the defense industrial base to enhance close air support 
operations with tablet and smartphone technologies.88 Prior to this innovation, the process 
for troops in contact to request critical close air support on the battlefield was less than 
optimal; it required constant radio communication with both the aviation assets and higher 
headquarters, redundant verification of locations (i.e., GPS, confirmed by the use of a map 
and compass), marking of projected targets, and mapping of projected ingress and egress 
routes for the aircraft, all while (potentially) seeking cover from incoming enemy fire. 
Stemming from DARPA’s work, troops on the battlefield now have access to close air 
support to engage targets by using encrypted, military network-enabled devices.89 Beyond 
close air support, future applications of this technology may even further enable the 
warfighter on the ground; similar applications may include controlling indirect fires, or 
more expediently processing aerial casualty evacuation request. 
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IV. WHAT MAKES THE UNITED STATES SUPERIOR? 
The purpose of an offset strategy is for the United States to gain (or regain) a 
strategic advantage over competitors. A strategic advantage affords supremacy and reduces 
parity. But how can the United States assure its supremacy? How does the United States 
know that its strategic advantage remains valid? What is it that actually makes the United 
States a supreme power in the international community? This chapter explores these 
questions by offering a series of postulations and analyses regarding what actually makes 
the United States superior. 
A. IS IT OUR ACUMEN IN WINNING WARS? 
As mentioned in Chapter II, militaries can win wars despite numeric inferiority—
or, for the purposes of this thesis, technological inferiority—through what Clausewitz 
describes as military genius: the effective synchronization of intelligence, deception, 
offense, defense, weaponry, and exploitation of terrain.90 Numerically, or technologically, 
inferior militaries can win wars against vastly superior adversaries if they can effectively 
harness the power of military genius. This was evident in the Continental Army’s victory 
over the British Empire during the Revolutionary War, the North Vietnamese successes 
against U.S. forces in the Vietnam War, and the prolonged engagements of coalition forces 
in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (conflicts in which the United States held 
unparalleled superiority yet still was mired in major combat operations).91  
The military represents only one of the United States’ four instruments of national 
power: diplomacy, information (which the military influences, but does not control), 
military, and economics. This thesis only addresses the military aspects of national power; 
however, it is important to remain cognizant that all the instruments of power are mutually 
dependent—none operate in a vacuum devoid of influences from each other. Military 
prowess cannot secure U.S. supremacy without effective diplomacy to negotiate treaties, 
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alliances, and policies for the escalation and de-escalation of hostilities. Information plays 
a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions, which in turn influence public support for 
military action. Economic sanctions contribute to the degradation of adversarial strength 
while relief aid purchases stability and reduces the requirements for military engagement. 
The superiority of the United States lies in its flexible ability to leverage the whole of its 
national power, shifting between diplomatic-, informational-, military-, or economic-led 
activities as the environment warrants. 
B. IS IT MERELY THE ABSENCE OF NEAR-PEER COMPETITORS? 
The key defining difference between near-peer states and near-peer competitor 
states is intent. Allied nations may hold capabilities comparable to the United States’, but 
they have no intention to use those capabilities to compete with the United States. 
Conversely, hostile nations may harbor the intention to challenge the United States but do 
not own the requisite capabilities to effectively compete.92 This thesis uses Thomas 
Szayna’s four criteria to quantify the capabilities a state requires to compete with the 
United States as a near-peer state: “power and motivation to confront the United States on 
a global scale in such a manner and magnitude that the outcome would be in doubt.”93 
• Power—A near-peer competitor’s power comes from more than just a 
dominant military strength. National power comes from an effective 
synthesis of the whole of government, including nodes of the economic, 
political, industrial, informational, educational, and legal systems.94 
• Motivation—Aligning with the intent to compete with the United States, 
the motivation of a near-peer competitor is the desire to act in order to 
unseat the status quo and gain more power and influence while 
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simultaneously decreasing the power and influence of the reigning 
dominant state(s).95 
• Global Scale—To suffice as a near-peer competitor with the United States, 
adversaries do not necessarily need the ability to challenge the United 
States in every region globally. Instead, near-peer competitors only require 
the capacity to challenge on a global scale in those regions deemed critical 
to the United States.96 
• Outcome of Conflict in Doubt—The true strength of a near-peer 
competitor is its potential to deny victory to the United States if conflict 
occurs. This is based on the state’s amassed power and skill relative to the 
United States’.97 
Statuses of supremacy, inferiority, and near-peer competitor can only be measured 
relative to the ascendance and decline of competing powers.98 The relative strengths and 
weaknesses of national superpowers are never constant and always fluctuate because states 
grow (or decline) and experience technological or industrial breakthroughs at uneven 
rates.99 State statuses between superior, near-peer, and in decline are temporary and not 
uniform. Great powers throughout history rise not solely from the strength and prowess of 
their militaries but from the interrelated correlations of their military power, their use of 
economic production during wartime, and their long-term economic stability relative to 
their competitors.100 In terms of near-peer parity, this means that efforts to counter and 
overcome the parity of competing nations require more than just military supremacy. 
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C. IS IT THE UNITED STATES’ ABILITY TO PROJECT POWER 
GLOBALLY? 
A distinct advantage held by the United States military is its persistent global 
presence. The U.S. has military installations on every (inhabited) continent. This provides 
the United States with an enduring forward-deployed presence in every region. With this 
presence, the United States holds a regional response force capable of rapidly responding 
to crisis or conflict. This enduring forward-deployed presence contributes to the local 
economies, which helps to establish or maintain regional stability. By strategically 
stationing military installations globally, the United States enhances its international 
relationships and partnerships. The national security of the hosting nation inherently 
increases with the presence of a U.S. military footprint within its borders, which provides 
a significant deterrent value while also providing a resident platform of U.S. diplomatic 
actions. 
In conjunction with the enduring forward-deployed installations, the U.S. military 
power projection provides a strategic advantage in its ability to rapidly deploy forces to 
every region. Robust naval and aeronautical capabilities afford the U.S. military global 
force deployment capabilities. Moreover, these platforms give the U.S. military the ability 
to influence and affect areas without actual insertion of forces. The U.S. military’s 
rotational deployment programs throughout the continents and oceans reinforce the ever-
present U.S. influence and a readily available response capability. Strategic prepositioning 
of logistics means that the U.S. military possesses the ability to conduct sustained, global 
operations whenever and wherever needed.  
D. IS IT THE STRENGTH OF OUR ALLIANCES AND TREATIES? 
For all of the might resident in the U.S. military, the interconnectivity of alliances 
with other nations multiplies the United States’ national power. Perhaps no other alliance 
is more notable, or critical, as NATO. This treaty, originally emplaced to counter and 
constrain the Soviet Union, continues its mission as a primary response mechanism to 
Russian threats to Europe. The greater benefit to the United States is the so-called 
“Collective Defence” clause (Article 5) of the treaty: 
29 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and 
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, 
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised 
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.101 
Beyond the Russian threat, and even the threat in Europe writ large, the significance 
of Article 5 to U.S. supremacy cannot be understated. Even if the United States does not 
(or did not) have the most powerful military in the world, it is reinforced by the militaries 
(and other instruments of national power) of the NATO nations. While the U.S. military 
sustains its supremacy, it does so with the assurance of counter-attack support from NATO. 
E. IS IT THE (IM)BALANCE OF POWER? 
According to the famed theorist Hans Morgenthau, the stability afforded by the 
equilibrium of national powers between competing states reduces the propensity for 
warfare.102 The balancing of powers prevents one state’s dominance over others, thereby 
eliminating one of the major causes of conflict. Traditional theories on deterrence, such as 
mutual assured destruction, seem to support this claim; neither the Soviet Union nor the 
United States used nuclear weapons on each other during the Cold War because they 
understood that doing so would result in a response in kind.103 The problem with this 
concept, however, is that it produces stagnation and embraces parity. U.S. policymakers 
recognize that innovation (and the subsequent adaptation for defense purposes) is an 
unending global cycle. States, regardless of any power balances, continue to compete to 
gain superiority. This is the security dilemma described by Robert Jervis.104 States have a 
vested interest in their own security, but every step they take to assure their own security 
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causes competitors to feel increasingly insecure and threatened. The United States has 
stood alone as the beneficiary of an imbalance of power since the end of the Cold War and 
the fall of the Soviet Union. To broaden its influence, the United States has built strong 
alliances and partnerships internationally to selectively balance nation powers toward its 
own advantages. Foreign aid and security cooperation globally help stabilize those regions 
most advantageous to the security of U.S. national interests. 
F. IS IT SOMETHING SPECIFIC FROM THE THIRD OFFSET 
STRATEGY? 
Broadly stated, the Third Offset Strategy seeks to widen the strategic gaps between 
the United States and its competitors. Uniquely, the Third Offset does not seek a strategic 
advantage through specific weaponry advances or warfare methods. Instead, the strategy 
directs innovation through alternative avenues. While such activity might secure the United 
States’ superiority, that security should be viewed as temporary. Subsequent chapters of 
this thesis will show that the near-peer competitors of the United States are taking very 
similar steps with comparable levels of success. This means that reliance on the Third 
Offset alone for supremacy is ill-advised. 
G. IS IT THE EFFICACY OF THE U.S. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX? 
The Third Offset Strategy directs the leveraging of both the military and industrial 
bases to rapidly innovate, develop, source, and field advanced technology for homeland 
defense purposes. A distinct advantage the United States holds with the Third Offset is the 
interconnectedness of its military-industrial complex—that is, the relationships between 
the armed forces and the commercial industries that support the military.105 Both sides 
benefit from this relationship: the defense industries never lack a customer base, and the 
military is constantly supplied with the most advanced warfare technologies. Together, the 
two bodies influence public policy by showing that the United States is willing to pay any 
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cost to prevail. In terms of the Third Offset, the military-industrial complex provides the 
opportunity for U.S. superiority by driving the constant need for improved defense 
technologies developed by the commercial industry. 
The U.S. advantage with the military-industrial complex comes from the freeness 
of its society, which enables to the United States to attract and retain the requisite talent for 
advanced technological innovations.106 U.S. trade practices, immigration laws, and 
national security policies help posture the United States for technological superiority by 
providing an environment most conducive and attractive to the best and brightest minds in 
the field.107 U.S. superiority comes not from the amount of financial resources invested in 
innovation but from the recruiting and retention of subject matter experts for innovation. 
The U.S. military-industrial complex also yields a greater return on investment in 
its production bases. China has a much larger manufacturing industry, but the United States 
continues to outpace China in conventional warfare and power-projection capacities.108 
The profitability of defense production can lead to the unintended consequences of altering 
economies. As manufacturers pivot toward defense weapons production, manufacturing of 
civilian products is outsourced (or shifted entirely) overseas.109 U.S.-led tariffs and trade 
wars could prove disastrous if the United States becomes too dependent on international 
trading partners for the manufacturing of all aspects of the American way of life, except 
the defense industry. 
While the U.S. military-industrial complex may provide the United States with a 
distinct strategic advantage over competing states, it has also prolonged engagements in 
some of the bloodiest wars in U.S. history. The industrial communities continue to develop 
warfare technologies for sale to the DoD because it is a lucrative practice. Defense 
spending, in turn, continues to support the purchasing of warfare technologies as a means 
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to buy superiority (whether or not there is a catalyst). This subsequently drives the 
industries to continue to produce and sell, which causes defense budget increases, and so 
the cycle perpetuates.110 The profits of the industrial base can cloud the political visions 
of war and international relations. Companies like Brown and Root (overseas construction) 
and Dow (weaponized chemical development) greatly profited from the prolonged 
involvement of U.S. forces in the Vietnam War, while escalation immediately to nuclear 
warfare (with industrially produced weapons) was the easy answer to crises in Korea and 
Cuba.111 
H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the supremacy of the United States. For this thesis, it is 
important to understand what ensures the supremacy of the United States because 
supremacy is (or should be) the intended goal of an offset strategy. While this chapter 
analyzed a series of questions regarding the supremacy of the United States, it may be 
difficult to accurately attribute any one factor as the decisive point for U.S. supremacy. 
More likely is that the United States’ source of supremacy comes from its acumen in 
leveraging all these factors (and others) in combination toward its national security. 
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V. CONDITIONS THAT (WILL) DEGRADE THE THIRD 
OFFSET STRATEGY 
This chapter explores those conditions that, if present, degrade the strategic 
advantage provided by the Third Offset Strategy. If decision-makers understand these 
conditions, they can engage in the requisite planning needed to both prolong the Third 
Offset and prepare for its replacement. Being proactive about this planning will allow the 
DoD to maintain the strategic advantage (instead of being forced to regain it). 
A. OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY-BASED SOLUTIONS 
Due to the nature of competitive innovation, much of the Third Offset focuses on 
advanced technologies. The following sections detail the vulnerabilities of the Third 
Offset’s heavy reliance on technological solutions for homeland defense. These include an 
increased vulnerability to espionage (particularly cyber espionage), enhanced 
susceptibility to intellectual property theft, and the false faith placed in technologies that 
have yet to be discovered. 
1. Vulnerability to Espionage 
Perhaps one of the biggest threats to the longevity of the Third Offset Strategy is 
its vulnerability to competitor espionage activity. Adversaries, particularly China, have 
proven extremely successful at the dark art of international espionage for the purposes of 
capturing U.S. military secrets. This is especially true in the cyberspace domain, where 
experts describe the United States as “under attack by digital bombs.”112 Skeptics of the 
Third Offset believe the prowess of the Chinese espionage program will lead (or already 
has led) to the capture, copy, and proliferation of the strategic advantage through the theft 
of the strategy’s classified technology.113 These fears are not unfounded. By 2013, Chinese 
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hackers had stolen U.S. design information for more than two dozen classified advanced 
weapons platforms, including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.114 Due to the efficacy of 
foreign espionage activities, some defense experts argue that any strategic advantages 
gained by Third Offset technology will only be temporary until the security of the 
technology is compromised and the information proliferated.115 
2. Susceptibility to Intellectual Property Theft 
Another threat to the endurance of the Third Offset Strategy, similar to espionage, 
is intellectual property theft—the stealing of inventions, ideas, trade secrets, etc.116 
Through the lens of the Third Offset Strategy, intellectual property theft entails the 
pilfering of advanced innovations and technologies relative to homeland defense priorities. 
Of the United States’ near-peer competitors, China is particularly adept in intellectual 
property theft. China’s use of advanced persistent threats (APTs) to burrow deep into 
networks and exploit sensitive or proprietary information makes the country especially 
dangerous to the Third Offset Strategy because so much of the strategy’s innovation occurs 
in the unclassified, commercial domain.117 
The subtle differences between espionage and intellectual property theft become 
even more difficult to distinguish when the stolen intellectual property pertains to state-
level functions like national security. For the purposes of this thesis, and relative to the 
Third Offset Strategy’s leverage of dual-use technological innovations, the difference 
between intellectual property theft and espionage remains very slight. The DoD response 
to both activities should be unified and should seek to preserve the innovative technologies 
of the Third Offset. 
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3. Technology Yet to Be Discovered 
Shortly after the 2014 announcement of the Third Offset Strategy, some security 
experts described then Secretary of Defense Hagel’s Defense Innovation Initiative as “the 
fairy dust strategy” and claimed that the DoD had opted for an easy, yet wholly inadequate, 
method: offering nonexistent technology as the solution to widen the gaps between the 
United States and near-peer competitors.118 Such claims are not entirely unfounded; unlike 
its predecessors, the Third Offset does not direct the advancement or implementation of 
any specific, concrete technologies. This broad, open strategy stipulates that the United 
States should widen the superiority gaps with competitors through advanced innovations, 
without much guidance as to how. 
This may be to the benefit of the Third Offset, as it enables the greatest degree of 
flexibility and initiative. But it also places the fate of national security into inventions that 
do not (presently) exist. In this sense, the Third Offset mistakes goals for strategy.119 The 
goal of the Third Offset is to establish a strategic advantage by developing superior 
technology; however, the strategy fails to clearly specify the leadership and conditions 
required to realize this goal. The significance of the over-reliance on yet-to-be-discovered 
technologies is especially of concern when considering that the near-peer competitors of 
the United States are not stagnant with their own technological innovations and advances. 
As this chapter later demonstrates, Russian and Chinese activities mirror (and in some 
cases outnumber) the United States’ efforts to innovate defense technologies. They too are 
working to establish their own strategic advantages over the United States and its allies. 
Effectively, the DoD has established hope as a course of action to gain a strategic 
advantage—hope that United States will discover breakthrough technologies first. The 
DoD has failed to face the problem by not clearly analyzing the obstacles and aligning the 
strategy to address them.120 
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B. FUNDING AND AUTHORITIES 
Beyond the advanced technological concerns for the Third Offset, the strategy may 
also become constrained by resource funding and authorization limitations. This section 
describes the impacts to the Third Offset Strategy caused by the persistent fiscal constraints 
of the current operating environment, the DoD’s competing homeland defense priorities, 
the unclear objectives guiding the strategy, and the role that national willingness to accept 
policies plays in the development and employment of the Third Offset. 
1. Persistent Fiscal Constraints 
The defense budget operates cyclically; it increases during periods of conflict and 
threats (real or perceived) and decreases during periods of peace.121 The current budgetary 
trends of the DoD reflect increases. However, the budget supports an overall smaller force 
than in previous fiscal years.122 Overall, the current defense budget projections allocate 
the majority of spending toward maintaining the force and growing conventional 
capabilities, not Third Offset innovations.123 Changing administration priorities may prove 
to be one of the biggest fiscal constraints to the Third Offset Strategy. 
In 2016 President-elect Donald Trump’s campaign promised to bolster the military 
with substantial increases in both personnel and equipment. Some defense experts argue 
that these promises were not in cadence with the Third Offset Strategy initiatives.124 The 
DoD may find funding supportable for either this extreme conventional military capability 
plus-up or for development of Third Offset priorities, but not for both. To combat these 
competing priorities, the administration’s fiscal year 2018 defense budget request sought a 
14 percent increase in research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) 
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allocations, with an emphasis on late-stage work on Third Offset innovations.125 While 
14 percent of the DoD’s budget is no small figure, it may not be enough to fully develop 
the innovative technologies of the Third Offset Strategy. 
2. Competing Homeland Defense Priorities 
While Third Offset innovations seek to establish and maintain a strategic advantage 
over near-peer competitors, they are also not the sole priorities of the DoD. In 2018 the 
DoD announced its intentions to field the creation of a Space Force by 2020.126 The United 
States’ (and arguably the planet’s) dependency on the stability and availability of the space 
domain for everything from commerce and communication to intelligence and security 
firmly establishes space as key terrain. Adversarial states acknowledge the relevance of the 
space domain as well.127 Stacking the priority of a Space Force on par with the Third 
Offset, however, detracts from the perceived significance of fully developing the strategy. 
The over-extension and misalignment of DoD priorities also distracts focus from 
the development of Third Offset innovations. Requests for defense support to civil 
authorities (DSCA) in response to emergencies in the homeland remains a persistent 
possibility.128 Outside the homeland, the U.S. military’s tasks to provide humanitarian aid 
and disaster response (HADR) serve to build the international relations and influence of 
the United States. While these missions are no less critical to supporting and defending the 
homeland, they are not the primary missions of the DoD.129 Furthermore, many of these 
missions are executed under service authorities, meaning that the individual branches of 
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the military, or the DoD itself, funds the support. This places the DoD in an awkward 
position of choosing between investing in Third Offset innovations or funding a military 
operation in support of a civil authority response to crises. 
Beyond the military’s support to crisis response at home and abroad, nation-
building is another competing requirement of homeland defense forces. Military presence 
remains one of the primary tools of best practice for U.S. nation-building efforts in conflict 
areas.130 As U.S. involvement in conflict areas continues to grow over time, so too does 
the requirement for military occupational forces overseas. These missions are not entirely 
devoid of homeland defense benefits, as they help secure global stability and early threat 
detection and mitigation.131 Nevertheless, despite their benefits, these missions 
persistently detract the DoD’s focus and resources from Third Offset innovation 
development. 
3. Unclear Objectives 
An effective strategy, according to B.H. Liddell Hart, artfully distributes and 
applies military power to reach policy objectives.132 In applying Hart’s concept, some 
military strategists claim that the Third Offset is actually not a strategy at all (or at least not 
a complete strategy) and that it will not automatically guarantee the United States’ victory 
in the next major war.133 Art Lykke believes that an effective military strategy for national 
security must have clearly defined objectives (ends), concepts to achieve those objectives 
(ways), and resources allocated to execute those concepts (means).134 The direction 
provided by the Third Offset guides the development of a means, but the strategy fails to 
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clearly identify what the ends are; nor does it describe the ways in which the means are to 
be applied to accomplish the ends. Simple ownership of superior technology alone does 
not guarantee operational success or supremacy, as the recent U.S. engagements in Iraq 
and Afghanistan demonstrated.135 Lacking a clearly stated objective and well-defined 
guidance for the application of technologies to achieve it, the Third Offset Strategy is 
incomplete. 
4. Willingness to Employ: Why Build it If You’ll Never Use It? 
For all of its innovation and development of game-changing technology, the Third 
Offset Strategy could suddenly prove obsolete if the requisite national will to use it wanes. 
With the searing images of August 6, 1945—the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki—imprinted on the minds of the international community, it is inconceivable that 
the United States would ever again deploy warfare technology as destructive and 
devastating as the atomic bombs. 
Conversely, the nation is only beginning to understand the broad implications of 
Russian and Chinese cyber-attack capabilities, especially as they pertain to the disruption 
of sovereign processes like voting and commerce. These examples are at the extremes of 
the kinetic and non-kinetic spectrums, but they may also serve to adversely affect the 
appetite of the American people and policy-makers to use Third Offset innovations for 
homeland defense. For all of its focus on innovative, revolutionary technologies for 
warfare, the Third Offset Strategy my defeat itself if the nation proves unwilling to actually 
deploy the weaponized technology it produces. For example, the DoD could leverage Third 
Offset deep-learning systems to develop the capabilities for a cyber Pearl Harbor attack. 
This could provide the United States with the potential for a strategic advantage over China 
and Russia. If the American people and policy-makers interpret that such an attack would 
violate the principles of lawful war, then such an attack is unlikely to ever be used and thus 
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provides no strategic advantage.136 Military necessity, unnecessary suffering, 
proportionality, and distinction remain the criteria against which all U.S. military action 
must be measured. 
C. NEAR-PEER ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE PARITY 
Countering parity with near-peer competitors is an ongoing, ever-adaptive process. 
Adversaries (or competitors) do not stay stagnant and continually adapt and fluctuate to 
attain their own strategic advantages. U.S. military strategists evaluating the Third Offset 
Strategy need to remain cognizant of this fact because strategic advantages are temporary 
(comparatively speaking). Reliance on a strategic advantage (or an offset strategy) that is 
no longer valid may prove detrimental. This section analyzes the Chinese and Russian 
responses to the Third Offset Strategy in order to evaluate the potential resulting 
degradations to the strategy. 
1. The Chinese Response to the Third Offset 
China has a diverse and complex system of national interests that align with the 
security and defense of its statehood, economy, and regional influence. The core Chinese 
national interests, as previously stated, are preserving Chinese sovereignty, securing the 
state of China, regaining the integrity and reunification of Chinese territories, safeguarding 
China’s political and social systems, and ensuring an enduring economy.137 
Central to supporting its national security interests is China’s use of cyber 
espionage and cyber-attack capabilities.138 Most of the detected Chinese cyber operations 
against U.S. private industries have targeted defense contractors, while China’s Strategic 
Support Force continues to advance its militarized cyber-attack and espionage 
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capabilities.139 This recent reinvigoration of Chinese cyber-attack capacities on U.S. 
military industries is undoubtedly an attempt to discover Third Offset technological 
innovations. 
Due to deep-seated distrust of U.S. intentions, it is possible the Chinese will not 
respond energetically to the Third Offset Strategy.140 Chinese officials may misinterpret 
the strategy as an attempt by the United States to lure China into a competitive technology 
arms race in which the United States has a distinct advantage due to its vast resources and 
industrial bases.141 Another possibility is that the Chinese may believe the Third Offset 
Strategy is a hollow ruse by the United States to mask its own deficiencies with promises 
of innovative technology.142 Whatever China’s response, it is unlikely to deviate far from 
the country’s long-term goal to rejuvenate its national power status; China will likely invest 
in Third Offset–like technologies to minimize the innovation gaps between U.S. and 
Chinese military capabilities.143 
The most likely Chinese response to the Third Offset Strategy is a campaign of 
espionage, theft, and replication. China’s National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology (which covers 2006 through 2020), or MLP, 
places great emphasis on improving and reinventing imported technology.144 Instead of 
competing with the U.S. industry and innovation processes, China will likely focus on a 
model of introduce, digest, assimilate, and re-innovate (IDAR) that centers on recovering, 
modifying, and proliferating U.S. next-generation, Third Offset technologies.145 Such a 
strategy is, effectively, sustainable indefinitely for the government of the People’s Republic 
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of China. China need not invest resources in innovation and development of strategic 
advantage-gaining technologies; they merely need to wait for the United States to do so, 
then discover how to replicate it. This strategy of recovering, modifying, and proliferating 
U.S. technologies affords limited advantages: China depends on U.S. innovation to fuel its 
own re-innovation, and at best China attains parity with the United States (never surpassing 
it). Nevertheless, by perpetually pressing the United States with parity, China can 
effectively challenge the Third Offset Strategy by forcing a state of creative destruction.146 
That is not to say that the Chinese base their entire innovation process on mirror-
imaging the United States’. China’s significant investment and innovation in technological 
fields of A2AD and Assassin’s Mace are clear efforts to undermine what the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes to be U.S. strategic advantages.147 Comparable 
to the Third Offset cornerstones of autonomy, unmanned platforms, and human-machine 
collaboration, the PLA is also investing heavily in similar technologies. PLA strategists 
see unmanned platforms as the future of warfare and believe that such operations will be 
semi-autonomous.148 Additionally, China’s heavy investment in quantum computing 
railguns and laser systems is further evidence of the country’s intent to reduce the gap in 
strategic advantages between the United States and China.149 Creative destruction is the 
theory that markets fail because, internally, they are in a perpetual state of change; markets 
therefore destroy old industries and innovate new industries to fulfill the changing demands 
of customers.150 This reduces the stability of the innovation processes because the 
requirements are constantly fluctuating.151 This effect can be detrimental to competing 
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states because the costs of long-term innovation competitions far outweigh the short-term 
innovative technology gains.152 
China’s preexisting military modernization has built, and continues to build, 
capacity and capability to challenge the United States.153 Chinese advances in late-
generational aircraft platforms parallel those of the United States, creating a situation of 
approximate parity in air superiority with China.154 The absence of air superiority 
notwithstanding, the Chinese further modernized their air defense capabilities toward 
negation of U.S. air penetration advantages.155 China’s attainment of partial parity extends 
beyond the domain of air and includes space. Chinese counter-space capabilities represent 
a competitive threat to the United States and its heavy reliance on network-enabled 
systems.156 
2. The Russian Response to the Third Offset 
While Moscow’s less-than-transparent politics complicate efforts to clearly define 
Russian national interests, experts agree that principal Russian national interests, as 
previously stated are, stopping the use of nuclear or mass-destruction weapons against 
former Soviet territories (including Russia itself), attaining deterrence through nuclear 
superiority, preventing terrorism in Russia, maintaining influence over former Soviet states 
while degrading outside influences in those region(s), achieving economic growth from the 
exportation of energy, preserving the Russian political system(s), and advancing the 
Russian elites’ major economic and political-business alliances.157 
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The Russians see their strategic and tactical nuclear weapons as their strategic 
advantage. Despite economic recessions, Russia remains at the forefront of nuclear 
weapons development and production despite spending a mere 5 percent of its defense 
budget on this initiative.158 Russia continues to develop and advance its strategic nuclear 
weapons program as a means to avoid the constraints of the U.S. ballistic missile defense 
capabilities and to deter U.S. precision strikes against Russian interests.159 In her April 
2017 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Air Force General Lori 
Robinson (then commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace 
Defense Command) acknowledged the growing capability and increased threat of Russian 
ballistic missiles ranging North America.160 As of 2018, the director of national 
intelligence has assessed that Russia’s new ground-launch cruise missiles provide the 
necessary military advantage to continue noncompliance with international treaties without 
fear of repercussions.161 
Russia’s reliance on nuclear options notwithstanding, the country’s proclivity and 
proficient use of hybrid warfare represents a significant concern for competitors like the 
United States.162 Russia’s use of active measures, such as cyber attacks against Estonia in 
2007 and again in 2014 as a precursor to military operations to seize the Crimea, represent 
a revolutionary method of warfare—particularly as Russia seeks to regain its influence over 
former Soviet states.163 Russia’s continued regional employment of these hybrid warfare 
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tactics potentially serves as a testing and evaluation platform to validate the capabilities 
against larger adversaries (i.e., the United States and other NATO nations). 
Much like the DoD, the Russians are also exploring advanced unmanned platforms 
as well as sourcing innovation institutions to help discover next-generation 
technologies.164 The Russian Advanced Research Foundation holds a similar mission 
purpose as DARPA: to research and develop high-risk, high-payoff technologies including 
artificial intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cognitive technologies, among other next-
generation capabilities.165 Russia previously demonstrated atypical warfare capabilities 
with its cyber attacks in Estonia (2007), the invasion of the Republic of Georgia (2008), 
and annexation of the Crimea (2014).166 Though all these actions predate the publication 
of the Third Offset Strategy, they indicate Russian testing of cyber warfare tactics. The 
lessons learned and best practices discovered during these events were (and are) no doubt 
leveraged against the United States.167 
Potentially less a response to the Third Offset Strategy, but congruent to it, is 
Russia’s growing cooperation with China. Russian companies are increasingly sub-
contracted for Chinese defense research and development, the Russians and the Chinese 
are jointly producing next-generation defense projects, and the Russians are trending 
toward greater importation of Chinese platforms for Russian defense priorities.168 By 
building alliances with China, both nations may be seeking to counter the Western regional 
hegemonies and reestablish their spheres of influence. 
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Perhaps the most visible way that the Russians are countering the Third Offset 
Strategy is through their continued, and unimpeded, provocation of the United States.169 
By continuing their provocative incursions to the United States and its sovereignties 
without triggering an energetic response from the United States (i.e., either a conventional 
military response or a response with weaponized Third Offset technology), Russia has 
effectively de-fanged the U.S. homeland defense enterprise. The unanswered aggressions 
toward the United States further embolden the Russians while validating that the United 
States is willing to build superior warfighting capabilities, but is not willing to actually use 
them. Every unanswered instance of Russian incursion on U.S. sovereignties further 
substantiates that the United States may hold the strategic advantages, but they will not use 
them. The Russians see this and continue to challenge the United States’ supremacy. 
3. Other Nations’ Responses to the Third Offset 
To face its future challenges, the United States must have strong international 
relationships, partnerships, and alliances.170 But what happens if, by widening the 
technology gaps with competitors, the United States inadvertently widens the technology 
gaps with its allies? Such a discrepancy degrades the overall supremacy of the United 
States and also potentially places its allies at risk from U.S. near-peer competitors. 
Perceivably, one of two options resolves this situation. Either European nations invest more 
into Third Offset technologies, or the United States shares its strategic innovations with its 
European allies.171 European nations are unwilling, or unable, to provide significant 
investment toward research and development of U.S. Third Offset technologies, precluding 
the first option. Resident barriers to technology-sharing constrain the second option.172 
These limitations foretell a scenario wherein the United States potentially holds a 
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significant innovation lead over friend and foe alike, seeding the international relations 
terrain with distrust and resentment. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter offered an analysis of the conditions that will degrade (or are currently 
degrading) the strategic advantage afforded by the Third Offset Strategy. The strategy is 
heavily reliant on technology-based solutions, which makes it vulnerable to espionage and 
susceptible to foreign-nation intellectual property theft. The dependency on technology 
also relies heavily on innovations that do not yet exist. The funding and authorities 
constraints also o challenge the relevancy of the Third Offset. Persistent fiscal constraints 
pit investment in Third Offset innovations against operation and maintenance allocations. 
Competing homeland defense priorities detract DoD focus from the Third Offset Strategy, 
which already lacks a clear vision and specific objectives. Finally, this chapter presented 
case studies showing that the near-peer competitors of the United States (i.e., China and 
Russia) have already taken great steps toward countering the Third Offset Strategy.  
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VI. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter consolidates the findings of the research of the Third Offset Strategy 
to assess the conditions that will render (or already have rendered) the strategy obsolete. 
These conditions, if met comprehensively or independently, should trigger the DoD to 
resign the Third Offset. This chapter also offers recommendations for the DoD to reinforce 
the Third Offset to prolong its strategic advantages and afford the requisite time to develop 
the next offset strategy. Finally, this chapter provides conclusions about the relevancy of 
the Third Offset Strategy. These conclusions will also highlight the limitations of the 
research and describe opportunities for additional research. 
A. THE CONDITIONS THAT TRIGGER OBSOLESCENCE OF THE THIRD 
OFFSET STRATEGY 
The conditions that will render the Third Offset Strategy obsolete are not finite and 
should be considered holistically relative to how they will affect the supremacy of the 
United States. Near-peer state activity to attain parity with Third Offset warfare capabilities 
may not automatically trigger a replacement of the strategy; however, if that parity could 
effectively challenge the U.S. strategic advantage then these actions indicate obsolescence. 
1. Espionage and Intellectual Property Theft 
The ever-present threat of information compromise at the hands of foreign entities 
is a reality that the DoD must deal with independent of the offset strategies. The aptitude 
of our adversaries to uncover clandestine U.S. projects infers that our national secrets are 
only cryptic temporarily. If the DoD finds itself sacrificing the majority of its Third Offset 
innovations to foreign actor espionage and intellectual property theft activities, the Third 
Offset Strategy becomes obsolete. 
2. Reliance on Yet-to-Be-Discovered Technology 
Because the Third Offset does not specify the innovation and development of any 
specific technologies or capabilities, it is difficult to effectively project when the strategy 
will be fulfilled. Congruently, the vagueness of the Third Offset entices the DoD into a 
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Sisyphean loop of perpetually innovating advanced warfare technologies only to discover 
that the Chinese, Russians, or others have already beaten the United States to the punch. 
Opportunities for innovation are infinite; however, the Third Offset Strategy is obsolete if 
the DoD cannot focus its innovation and industrial bases’ energies on pivotal national 
security objectives. Relying on future technologies to solve the problems of today is 
insufficient.173 
3. Persistent Fiscal Constraints 
While it may be impossible to place an acceptable price on national security, the 
Third Offset Strategy cannot become the ubiquitous pit into which unrecoverable resources 
sink. If DoD investments in Third Offset innovations do not effectively mature to produce 
an appreciable deterrent value—which is quantifiable as the containment of state-level 
aggression against the United States—then the strategy has become obsolete.174 
4. Competing Homeland Defense Priorities 
The broad scope of mission sets for the U.S. military toward continues to grow and 
is unlikely to relent in the near future. The Third Offset should be deemed obsolete if the 
U.S. military’s engagement in detracting homeland defense missions precludes its ability 
to exploit and capitalize upon the strategic advantages afforded by the strategy. 
5. Unclear Objectives 
By design, the Third Offset Strategy does not overtly name an opposing force or 
enemy. This has enabled a greater degree of flexibility to leverage the Third Offset against 
state and non-state actors alike. The problem, however, is that this anonymity of goals 
prevents concerted efforts toward a unified objective. If Third Offset innovations, as a 
whole, do not contribute directly and purposely to the attainment of national defense 
objectives, as specified in the National Security Strategies, then the Third Offset Strategy 
is obsolete. 
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6. Willingness to Fully Employ 
Fluctuations in the national will are another factor that may significantly impact the 
relevancy of the Third Offset Strategy. Third Offset innovations must conform to the 
parameters of acceptable warfare that the nation is willing to fully employ. If, under the 
pretense of the Third Offset, the DoD develops an innovation so destructive and 
devastating that public opinion and/or political pressure preclude ever using such a weapon, 
then the strategy is no longer relevant. 
7. Near-Peer Parity 
Near-peer competitor attainment of parity cannot be a criterion for the obsolescence 
of the Third Offset Strategy. Instead, parity should be viewed as a failure of the strategy 
itself. Should the near-peer competitors of the United States attain parity, the United States 
loses its strategic advantage. The historical trend of reactivity demonstrated throughout the 
retirements and replacements of the First and Second Offset Strategies is a risk to national 
security that the United States cannot afford. The tempo at which near-peer competitors 
are able to adapt and innovate to negate U.S. strategic advantages and attain their own 
advances creates an unforgiving environment where a missed opportunity by the United 
States to advance its supremacy may be unrecoverable. 
8. Too Wide a Technology Gap with Allies 
The Third Offset Strategy is U.S.-centric. Much of the influence and power that the 
United States wields, however, comes not from the organic strength of its own military but 
from the massing of ally forces toward objectives. Many of the United States’ most critical 
allies cannot (or are unwilling to) invest in Third Offset technologies at a pace comparable 
to the United States’. Further agitating the environment, security classifications or 
proprietary technologies may preclude the sharing of technologies between states (even 
within the same alliances). This may broaden the technology gaps between not only the 
United States and its near-peer competitors but also between the United States and its 
closest allies. If the Third Offset builds an advanced technology gap so wide that it degrades 
the United States’ strategic alliances, then the strategy is no longer relevant and, in fact, 
becomes a hindrance to national security. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The following recommendations, if implemented by the DoD, could prolong the 
strategic advantage afforded by the Third Offset Strategy. Offset strategies do not endure; 
at some point the Third Offset will lose relevancy and need to be replaced. The goal of 
these recommendations is to extend the strategic advantage of the Third Offset to buy time 
for the DoD to develop its replacement. 
1. Countering Intellectual Property Theft and Cyber Espionage 
To combat the growing, aggressive threats of Chinese intellectual property theft 
and cyber espionage, the DoD should adopt a modified variant of Shultz and Saporito’s 
“do nothing” strategy.175 Innovative technology is highly dynamic and subject to short life 
cycles. Some innovations become obsolete so fast that it is not cost effective to even fully 
investigate how the data were compromised. There is a fine line between investigating how 
the information was stolen and dwelling on the past.176 Once discovered, the DoD should 
investigate the intellectual property theft to determine its origins and extent. The DoD 
should fight impulses to immediately discard all of the stolen technologies and start anew 
in the innovation process. Adversaries are unlikely to reduce their intellectual property 
theft efforts, and are likely to proliferate the stolen technology as broadly as possible.177 
This gives the DoD the opportunity to effectively weaponize the creative destruction 
process.178 
Say, for example, that a near-peer competitor steals the nascent plans for a U.S. 
fifth-generation fighter jet.179 The United States has two options: abort or adapt. The first 
option is to cease all productions of fifth-generation fighters and begin work to innovate 
new fighter jet capabilities. This option places the United States in the disadvantageous 
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position of creative destruction. The United States destroys all processes relative to the 
fifth-generation fighters, and begins creation of the next generation of aircraft. During this 
cycle, the United States wastes countless resources while gaining no strategic advantage. 
Meanwhile the competing state attains parity through the proliferation of fifth-generation 
aircraft, and expends no resources on organic innovation. They merely need to monitor the 
U.S. innovation process and wait for the opportune time to steal the new fighter 
specifications to force the United States back into the creative destruction cycle. 
The other option is for the United States is to adapt to the compromise, which 
allows the competitor to proliferate the fifth-generation aircraft, and alter its tactics and 
doctrine to optimize the use of fifth-generation aircraft. Instead of destroying the fifth-
generation innovations, the United States simply finds a better way to use them: coupling 
stealth capabilities with those of electronic warfare, integrating stealth aircraft operations 
with maritime capabilities to enhance the global power projection values, and equipping 
the fifth-generation aircraft with a vast array of munitions, making it a game-changing 
weapon of warfare. By taking these steps, the United States avoids the pitfalls of creative 
destruction while effectively forcing the near-peer competitor into its own creative 
destruction cycle. Now, the competing state has to expend resources to destroy and create 
if it wishes to contend with the United States. 
The difficulty of this weaponization of the creative destruction process is that it is 
totally reliant upon defense planners to find alternative, more beneficial uses for the 
original (proliferated) technological innovations. Flexibility is often not the strongest trait 
of the DoD, but the department must remain agile and capable of pivoting into the 
destruction phase if a more optimal use for the innovation is not apparent. Such flexibility 
is, if attainable, a capable advantage that the DoD holds over near-peer competitors’ 
militaries. 
2. Countering the Reliance on Nonexistent Technologies 
While the Third Offset places great significance on the development of advanced 
warfare technology in the future, conspicuously missing from the strategy is the topic of 
sustaining conventional warfare technologies. Many adversarial states, not just near-peer 
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competitors, believe their strategic advantages comes from robust nuclear weapons 
programs.180 The theory of mutual assured destruction largely explains why the Cold War 
from did not escalate to a nuclear war, and the theory should remain equally relevant today. 
In short, the theory explains that nations would have no actual incentives to use their 
nuclear weapons if there was a credible threat that they would face a proportional 
counterattack. Put another way, the Soviets never used their nuclear weapons to attack 
Washington, DC, because they knew that if they did they should expect the United States 
to use its nuclear weapons to attack Moscow. In response to Moscow the Soviets would 
attack New York City, which would trigger the United States to attack St. Petersburg, and 
so on until both nations crumble. 
The DoD should exercise caution to ensure that future offset strategies do not 
devolve back to their predecessors’ forms.181 At the same time, the department must 
remain cognizant of the fact that nuclear weapons are the preferred weapons of our 
adversaries. If the United States relaxes its nuclear weapons program, it loses a significant 
deterrent against many of its potential adversaries. 
Where mutual assured destruction theory failed, however, was in the deterrence of 
all hostilities. While effective at preventing the use of nuclear weapons, the theory failed 
to prevent the use of force below the nuclear level, including proxy wars.182 In conjunction 
with the aforementioned sustainment of nuclear programs, the DoD should advise 
leveraging offset strategy technology innovations against near-peer competitors to counter 
and deter non-nuclear activity. In doing so, the United States should remain cautious as it 
engages in such an innovation arms race with competitors. During the Cold War, the quest 
for nuclear superiority between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in an all-
out nuclear arms race.183 If the United States is imprudent with its reliance upon, and 
investments in, innovative technologies, it could easily find itself disadvantaged in a 
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comparable arms race for technological superiority. A technology arms race of this nature 
is highly disadvantageous for both the United States and Russia. Schumpeter’s theory of 
creative destruction says that innovative markets fail because, internally, they are in a 
perpetual state of change; they constantly destroy old industries and innovate new 
industries to suit the new demands of consumers.184 This eternal destruction and building 
in the industry causes reduced market stability and results in limited innovation because 
the needs being filled constantly change.185 After failure, innovative markets rebuild in 
revolutionary forms.186 This means that an innovative technologies arms race could result 
in competition so fierce that extensive investments and developments result in no progress 
gained because technologies are overmatched as soon as they are fielded. This also means 
that the rebirths of defense innovation after failure could impact (positively or negatively) 
the economic, and other, instruments of national power beyond just the military force. 
Moreover, the DoD should analyze the near-peer competitors of the United States 
through the lens of the Third Offset to focus its energy (and the subsequent energies of the 
innovation industries) on established strategic objectives for national security. Technology 
innovation for its own sake is dangerous. Listless investment in defense innovations, 
lacking the guiding principles of defined strategic objectives, drains valuable time and 
resources from defense priorities. 
3. Countering the Cyber Threat 
Lured into a false sense of security through deterrence, the U.S. intelligence 
community believes that fear of U.S. retaliation reduces the probability of large-scale cyber 
attacks against the homeland.187 The inherently non-attributional and anonymous 
environment of cyberspace negates the deterrent value of any U.S. counter action in 
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retaliation of a cyber attack. The DoD should leverage Third Offset artificial intelligence 
systems toward autonomous machinery to focus not just on the defense of cyber attacks 
but also on perpetrator attribution.188 Prosecution of state-sponsored (or state-directed) 
cyber attackers may not always result in military action; however, accurate and timely 
attribution is absolutely necessary for any manner of response. 
Staying within the cyberspace domain, the DoD should approach the building of 
cyber deterrence capabilities with caution. The ensuing cyber arms race between the United 
States and competitors could easily result in what Matthew Crosston calls mutually assured 
debilitation.189 This theory applies similar concepts as its ancestral mutual assured 
destruction theory: fear of retaliatory second strikes deters offensive actions.190 The DoD 
should plan to adopt a two-pronged approach to cybersecurity: deterrence through robust 
cyber attack/counter cyber attack capabilities, and enhanced network hardening to reduce 
the feasibility of cyber attacks. This enhanced network security should not become so 
stringent that it inadvertently discourages the use of the network writ large. If the networks 
become so secure that they ultimately inhibit basic forms of communication (e.g., data 
transfers, electronic mail, video teleconferences), network users may defer to less efficient 
and less secure forms of communication (e.g., personal cell phones and electronic mail, 
open-source media). 
4. Countering the Persistent Fiscal Constraints 
The DoD should exercise patience and recognize that failure is a critical process of 
innovation. Constant funding competition may tempt the department to retire Third Offset 
innovations prematurely and reallocate resources to other initiatives; the DoD must resist 
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this temptation. The department should learn from its mistakes, invest in its innovations’ 
failures, and improve based on lessons learned.191 
5. Establishing Clear Strategic Objectives for the Third Offset 
The Third Offset Strategy is presently the answer to every national defense 
problem, and thus it is the answer to none. As the DoD continues to research and develop 
Third Offset technologies and innovations, it should remain cognizant of the strategic 
objectives for its investment. Superior technological advances alone cannot attain a 
strategic advantage. The strategic objectives of the Third Offset Strategy should be 
specified in the National Defense Strategy, as directed by the National Security Strategy. 
This may mean that the offset strategies must remain agile and flexible, able to span 
administrations and adapt to changes in national interests. 
6. Conforming to National Willingness to Employ 
Defense planners should remain particularly attuned to the political environment 
and public opinions relative to Third Offset Strategy capabilities. Third Offset innovations 
must remain a viable option for DoD deployment, within the standards and interpretations 
of just war theory.192 
7. Narrowing the Technology Gap with Allies 
The DoD should adjust its approach to the Third Offset Strategy to account for the 
significant role allied nations play in ensuring global stability and defense of the U.S. 
homeland. The Third Offset is a U.S. strategy, but it cannot exist in a vacuum. The DoD 
should focus on increased sharing of its technological advances with trusted allies, in order 
to preserve (and improve) existing international relations, enhance the allied nations’ roles 
in securing the U.S. national interests as well as their own, and avoid the building 
resentment of U.S. superiority from friend and foe alike. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
How can the Department of Defense determine if the Third Offset Strategy is 
obsolete? The answer to this thesis question is that the DoD should deem the Third Offset 
Strategy obsolete if the conditions described in this thesis are met, and their attainment 
serves to challenge the supremacy of the United States. 
To arrive at this conclusion, the thesis first explained what offset strategies are and 
why they are significant to national security. The thesis then provided an overview of the 
reactivity of the previous two offset strategies and introduced the Third Offset Strategy. 
Next, the thesis defined the supremacy of the United States as a means to comprehend the 
core intentions of an offset strategy and presented an analytical approach to the conditions 
that will degrade (or already have degraded) the strategic values of the Third Offset. 
Finally, this thesis presented a list of conditions that, if met, individually or 
comprehensively, should trigger the DoD to withdraw from the Third Offset Strategy. 
These conditions were related to espionage and intellectual property theft, the strategy’s 
reliance on nonexistent technologies, persistent fiscal constraints of the operating 
environment, competing homeland defense priorities, the unclear objectives of the Third 
Offset, national will to employ the strategy’s innovations, near-peer parity, and technology 
gaps with allies. Finally, the thesis presented recommendations that the DoD can enact to 
prolong the strategic advantages afforded by the Third Offset. 
By understanding what could render the Third Offset obsolete, what already has 
degraded it, and how to control the flow of disruptive innovations into the homeland 
defense realm, the DoD is better postured to maintain its strategic advantage by weighting 
the Third Offset to prolong its strategic benefits, and by recognizing when to replace the 
strategy in advance of near-peer parity. The deterioration of the U.S. strategic advantage is 
unlikely to be sudden; it is more likely to be a prolonged and gradual process.193 The 
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United States cannot wait for the crisis of the disadvantage to address the near-peer threat; 
the country must remain proactive in avoiding such a situation entirely.194 
D. CURRENT RELEVANCE OF THE THIRD OFFSET 
It is the opinion of the author that the Third Offset Strategy is obsolete in its current 
form. It lacks clear guidance for its objectives, giving it no metric by which to assess its 
efficacy. The strategy’s reliance on technology that does not currently exist gives the Third 
Offset an increased chance of failure because it asks for faith that these technologies will 
exist when they are needed. The Third Offset faces numerous hurdles from within the DoD, 
as funding for research and innovation competes with the overall pool of operations and 
maintenance resources. While the United States holds distinct advantages in innovation, it 
is foolish to believe that our near-peer competitors are not working feverishly to close the 
technological expertise gaps. 
This is not to imply that the Third Offset Strategy should be replaced forthwith. 
While many of the conditions outlined in this thesis have been met, or may soon be met, 
they have not adversely impacted the supremacy of the United States. The evaluation, 
refinement, and implementations of the recommendations of this thesis would restore the 
deterrent value of the Third Offset by aligning its priorities toward unified objectives and 
ensuring a comprehensive mitigation of the strategy’s challenges. 
E. LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
This thesis only addressed the military aspects of supremacy and national power. 
Military might alone cannot ensure the superiority of a state; it must work in concert with 
the other elements of national power. The true superiority of the United States lies in its 
flexible ability to leverage the whole of its national power, shifting between diplomatic-, 
informational-, military-, or economic-led activities as the environment warrants. 
For the purposes of processing, development, and distribution, this thesis 
consciously remained at the unclassified, unlimited distribution level. There is, 
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unquestionably, greater detailed information on the subject available at higher levels of 
security classification. 
The concepts and content of this thesis represent the research and original work of 
the thesis author and advising committee. This thesis does not represent the opinions of the 
Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Marine Corps, or the Department of Defense. 
F. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this thesis was to encourage proactive planning for the sustainment 
of the U.S. strategic advantage. The dynamic homeland defense environment is 
unforgiving toward passive reactivity. National defense planners must proactively plan for 
the sustainment of strategic advantages; the United States may not have the luxury of time 
to regain a decisive advantage over competing near-peer states in the future. The offset 
strategies only represent a military-centric mechanism to avoid parity. Future research 
should assess state-level diplomacy, weaponized economics, and the roles of information 
in providing U.S. supremacy and national security. 
This thesis also intentionally did not overtly opine on the design of a Fourth Offset 
Strategy. The intention of this thesis was to determine what conditions would render the 
Third Offset obsolete; however, the current strategy is not enduring. At some point in the 
future the Third Offset will prove irrelevant. Future research is required to determine if 
another offset strategy is required to provide a strategic advantage for the United States. 
This research should include an analysis of how the Third Offset failed and a reassessment 
of the threat(s), and should detail the capabilities and capacity the DoD requires to ensure 
military supremacy in the future. 
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